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Abstract
Policy interventions in large open economies do not only affect the allocation of domestic resources but change
international market prices. The change in international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all
trading countries. This secondary terms of trade effect may have important welfare implications: Countries without
change in domestic policies may nevertheless gain or suffer from the action of other countries; in turn, the primary
welfare effect of countries interfering domestically may be substantially enhanced or weakened due to international
spill-overs. Obviously, policy makers of economies that are integrated into international markets have an essential
interest to gain insights about the different sources of welfare changes associated with domestic policy changes. In
this paper, we present a decomposition that splits the overall welfare effect into a domestic market effect holding
international prices constant and an international market effect as a result of changes in  international prices (terms of
trade effect). We demonstrate the usefulness of our decomposition approach in the context of an empirical welfare
analysis of international carbon abatement policies.
*Helpful comments have been provided by Thomas Osang. None of the views expressed here should be attributed to
any of our employers or research sponsors.
11. Introduction
Policy measures in large open economies not only cause adjustments of domestic production and
consumption patterns but affect international prices via changes in exports and imports. The changes in international
prices imply a secondary burden or benefit  in addition to the primary domestic policy effect. A large country could
exploit international market power and influence international prices at the expense of its trading partners (beggar-
thy-neighbor policy).
Not surprisingly, policy makers in open economies are concerned about the sign and the magnitude of
international spill-over effects from domestic policy intervention. The current debate on climate change policy is an
example where such concerns arise. Developing countries which have not made any commitment for domestic
emission abatement fear nevertheless adverse economic effects due to the abatement measures of industrialized
countries. The Kyoto Protocol explicitly reflects these concerns in stating that developed countries “...shall strive to
implement policies and measures ... in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including ... the effects on
international trade, and ... economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing  countries Parties ...“ (UN
1997, Article 2, paragraph 3).
 Given the potential importance of international spill-overs this paper provides a decomposition of the total
(general equilibrium) effects associated with domestic policy measures in open economies. We break down the total
policy effect for a single country into a domestic market effect (i. e. domestic adjustment holding international prices
constant)  and an international policy effect (the residual effect accounting for changes in the terms of trade).
Splitting the total welfare effect into these components conveys important economic information as to why a country
will benefit or loose from adjustments in domestic and international markets.
We illustrate the policy relevance of  our decomposition approach with an example of international carbon
abatement policies. Based on a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use we
show that spill-over effects of domestic abatement policies on international markets have important economic
consequences on both abating and non-abating regions..
In section 2 we lay out the decomposition approach, in section 3 we describe the policy application, and in
section 4 we present our conclusions.
22. Decomposition Approach
The general equilibrium approach is an established analytical framework for evaluating the economic
implications of policy intervention in open economies (Shoven and Whalley 1992). Its main virtue is the
comprehensive and (microeconomic) consistent simulation of the direct and indirect effects (feedbacks or spill-
overs) induced by exogenous policy changes. However, the interpretation of general equilibrium effects as a sum of a
number of partial effects is difficult, in particular if the partial effects work in opposite directions. Therefore, one
challenge of general equilibrium modeling is to provide decomposition methods that facilitate analysis of the various
sources of total effects such as aggregate welfare changes. In the context of customs-union formation, Harrison,
Rutherford and Wooton (1993) present a decomposition method that splits down the total welfare effect into two
components: the consequences of induced changes in domestic prices (home price effect); and the effects on income
of adjustments in tariff rates and endogenous changes in the pattern and volume of trade (tariff revenue effect).1 Huff
and Hertel (1996) describe a decomposition of welfare effects where changes in welfare are directly related to tax
changes interacting with equilibrium quantity changes. Here, we show that the welfare effects of any policy
intervention in large open economies can be composed of a domestic market effect assuming that international prices
remain constant and an international market effect as a result of changes in  international prices (terms of trade
effect).
We formally present the decomposition approach along a generic static multi-region trade model (MRT).
Each region’s final demand structure is portrayed by a representative agent who allocates expenditure across goods
so as to maximize welfare. The level of investment and public output is fixed. Production incorporates intermediate
inputs and primary factors. Traded commodities of the same variety are differentiated by origin (Armington 1969).
The level of aggregate foreign lending or borrowing  for each region is kept constant.
 For each region three classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium: zero-profit, market
clearance, and income balance. Associated with these conditions are three classes of  variables: activity levels (for
constant-returns-to-scale firms1), commodity prices and consumer incomes. In equilibrium, each variable is linked to
one condition: an activity level to an exhaustion of product constraint, a commodity price to a market clearance
condition, and a consumer income variable to an income definition equation. In our algebraic exposition, the notation
                                                       
1 In a competitive setting we may characterize technologies as CRTS without loss of generality. Decreasing returns
are accommodated through the introduction of a specific factor.
3z
irP  is used to denote the profit function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the activity
describing domestic production (z=Y), aggregate import formation (z=M) and final demand (z=C).
Differentiating  the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand
and supply coefficients, which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. The notations adopted for our
algebraic representation are summarized in Table 1. The equilibrium conditions are given in Table 2.
We decompose the economic effects associated with policy changes in open economies into a domestic
market effect and an international market effect. The domestic market effect reflects a small open economy (SOE)
setting where the level of a region’s imports and exports have no effect on the terms of trade.2 Algebraically, the
SOE specification is identical to the MRT model formulation with the sole difference that prices on international
markets are fixed in international currency units, i.e. prices of commodity i exported by region s are exogenously
given as 
x
isp  . Foreign closure of  the SOE model requires an additional condition that states equality of the value of
imports with the value of exports. Table 3 provides the algebraic summary of the SOE module for each region of the
MRT model.
Table 1: Summary of notations for the generic MRT
Summary of Denotations
N Number of commodities (sectors)
K Number of factors
M Number of countries/regions
i = 1,..,N Index for commodities (sectors)
j = 1,..,N+K Index for commodities and factors
r,s = 1,..,T Index for region
u Revenue function
w Cost function
jrp Price of domestic output good (j Î  {1,...,N}) or factor (j Î  {N+1,..., N+K})  in region r
X
irp
Export price for good i produced in region r
M
irp
Price for  aggregate import good i imported by region r
C
rp
Composite price for aggregate household demand in region r
irY Level of production for sector i in region r
irM Level of aggregate imports for sector i in region r
rC Aggregate household consumption in region r
jrE Endowment of region r with factor j (j Î  {N+1,..., N+K})
                                                       
2 Hence, we can omit export demand and import supply functions within the algebraic model formulation.
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Table 3: Algebraic Summary of the SOE
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5The SOE specification allows us to impose any change in international prices (terms of trade)
parametrically by changing the values for 
X
irp . Hence, we can easily check the consistency of our decomposition for
any MRT policy simulation (counterfactual equilibrium).  We fix international prices 
X
ip  for the SOE at the level
X
irp  determined by the MRT counterfactual and then initialize the level values for SOE variables using the MRT
solution. Without numerical work we should be able to replicate the MRT solution for any country from an SOE
perspective.3
Having passed the consistency check we can use the SOE framework in order to decompose the total MRT
policy effect into a domestic market effect and an  international market effect. Computation of the domestic market
effect simply requires that we keep the international prices at the benchmark (reference) level and then impose the
domestic policy change on the specific country.4 When we impose parametrically the changes in the terms of trade as
calculated by the MRT counterfactual we replicate the MRT solution using the SOE framework. Obviously, the
international market effect is equal to the difference between the total (general equilibrium) policy effect and the
domestic market effect.
Figure 1 illustrates the steps involved in the decomposition procedure. For the intermediate SOE
equilibrium calculation (AèB), the domestic market has no effect on international prices. Imposing the changes in
terms of trade (international market effect) which are delivered by the multi-region computation (AèC), we exactly
reproduce the MRT solution from the SOE perspective (BèC).
Of course, the MRT-SOE decomposition allows  to measure the international market effect separately by
commodity. We simply parameterize the SOE model with the international price for that commodity using the MRT
framework. We then can measure how the change in terms of trade for the specific commodity affects economic
performance in the small open economy.
                                                       
3 This procedure is equivalent to the standard replication check for calibrated models.
4 By definition, the domestic market effect must be zero for any country where no domestic policy change applies.
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Figure 1: Decomposition procedure
3. Policy Application: Decomposing the Welfare Effects of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN 1997) fixes
legally binding quantified greenhouse gas emissions limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) for Annex B
parties.5 On average Annex B parties have committed themselves to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 % from
1990 levels in the budget period 2008 to 2012 but QELROs across Annex B parties differ.
                                                       
5 Annex B countries include industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition, such as Eastern and
Central Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union.
7Table 4: Quantified Emissions Limits under the Kyoto Protocol (UN 1997)
Country or Region Label Commitments (Percentage of 1990 Base Year
Greenhouse Gas Emissions)
United States of America USA 93
Canada CAN 94
European Union EUR 92
Japan JPN 94
Former Soviet Union FSU 100
Other OECD OOE 107
The developing countries have refused so far any abatement commitment. The reason is that they fear
negative effects of emissions limitation on their economic development and demand primary action by the developed
world with large historical and current emissions.
Yet, unilateral adjustment to emission restrictions in the developing world will produce secondary spill-
overs to international markets and affect the developing countries through changes of international prices. The
potential importance of these international market effects (terms of trade effects) have been recognized within the
Kyoto Protocol  (UN 1997, Article 2, paragraph 3). In the context of  international burden sharing,  the quantification
of the sign and magnitude of the secondary terms of trade effect at the regional level appears to be highly policy
relevant.
A. Modeling Framework
The analytical framework we use is a static 7-sector, 12-region general equilibrium model of the world
economy.6 The sectors in the model have been chosen to keep the most carbon intensive sectors as separate as
possible in the available data.7 The regional aggregation covers the Annex-B parties as well as major non-Annex-B
regions which are central to the greenhouse gas issue. Table 5 summarizes the 7 sectors and 13 regions incorporated
in our model.
Primary factors include labor, capital and fossil-fuel resources. Labor and capital are intersectorally mobile
within a region but cannot move between regions. Fossil-fuel resources are specific to fossil fuel production sectors
in each region.
                                                       
6 Hence, we ignore potentially important impacts of carbon abatement on the level and pattern of investment across
countries. The model provides rather conservative estimates of the cost of abatement because we would expect that
carbon emission limits will reduce the return to capital and result in lower overall GDP growth in the Annex B
countries.
7 This ensures a best-guess approximation of differences in carbon intensities, the scope for substitutability across
carbon-intensive goods and hence the potential for terms of trade effects triggered by carbon abatement policies.
8 Table 5: Overview of sectors and countries/regions (data base: GTAP 3.0; see McDOUGALL 1997)
Sectors Regions
Label Long name Label Long name
COL Coal USA United States
CRU Crude oil CAN Canada
GAS Natural gas EUR Europe
ROP Refined oil products JPN Japan
ELE Electricity OOE Other OECD
EIS Energy-intensive sectors FSU Former Soviet Union
Y Other manufactures and services CEA Central European Associates
CHN China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan)
BRA Brazil
IND India
ASI Other Asia
MPC Mexico and OPEC
ROW Rest of World
Production of commodities (ROP, ELE, EIS, Y) other than fossil fuels is captured by an aggregate
production function which characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on the output side and
substitution possibilities on the input side. On the output side production is split between goods produced for the
domestic markets and goods produced for the export market subject to a constant elasticity of transformation. On the
input side constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions with three levels are employed to specify the
KLEM substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material (non-energy)
intermediate inputs. At the top level non-energy inputs are employed in fixed proportions with an aggregate of
energy, capital  and labor.  The material input of good i in sector j corresponds to a CES Armington aggregate of
non-energy inputs from domestic production and imported varieties. At the second level a CES function describes
the substitution possibilities between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of labor and capital. Finally, at the third
level capital and labor trade off with a constant elasticity of substitution. As to the formation of the energy aggregate
we allow sufficient levels of nesting to permit substitution between primary energy types as well as substitution
between a primary energy composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
In production of fossil fuels (CRU, GAS, COA) labor, capital and fossil fuel inputs are aggregated in fixed
proportions at the lower nest. At the top level  this aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil-fuel resource at
a constant elasticity of substitution. The latter is calibrated to be consistent with exogenously given price elasticities
of fossil fuel supplies.
9Final demand in each region is determined by a representative agent who is maximizing his utility subject to
an income balance constraint with fixed investment. Total income of the representative household consists of factor
income and taxes8. Final demand of the representative agent is given as a CES composite which combines
consumption of an energy aggregate and a non-energy consumption bundle. Substitution patterns within the non-
energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas functions with an Armington aggregation of imports and
domestic commodities. The energy aggregate in final demand consists of the various energy goods trading off at a
constant elasticity of substitution.
All commodities are traded internationally. Crude oil and coal are imported and exported as a homogeneous
product, subject to tariffs and export taxes. For all other commodities we adopt the Armington assumption of product
differentiation with an explicit representation of bilateral trade flows.
B. Parameterization: Base Year Calibration and Forward Projection
The economic effects of the Kyoto Protocol depend crucially on the extent to which QELROs bind the
economies in the budget period. In other words, the magnitude and distribution of costs associated with the
implementation of future emission constraints depend on the Business-as-Usual (BaU) projections for GDP, fuel
prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. In our comparative-static framework we infer the BaU structure of the
model’s regions for 2010 using most recent projections on the economic development. We then measure the costs of
abatement relative to that baseline.
As a starting point for our forward projection we use the GTAP 4 database (McDougall 1997) and
OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996)  for 1995 which is the most recent year for which a complete set of statistics
are available.9 We use the reconciliated benchmark data for this year to calibrate parameters of the CES functional
forms from a given set of quantities and prices (given exogenous elasticities). In a second-step we do the forward
calibration of the 1995 economies to 2010 based on baseline estimates by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE
1998) for GDP growth, energy demand and future energy prices.
C.  Policy Implementation and Computational Results
Our comparative-static model measures the costs of implementing Kyoto as compared to a BaU reference
point in 2010 where no emission abatement requirements exist. In the policy simulation Annex B countries apply
                                                       
8 In the benchmark the model includes taxes on output, intermediate inputs, exports and  imports as well as on final
demand.
9 See Babiker and Rutherford (1997) for the assembly and reconciliation of these data sources.
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domestic carbon taxes which are sufficiently high to meet their individual Kyoto commitment. Revenues from
carbon taxation are recycled lump-sum to the representative agent in each region.
Emission Reduction Requirements and Marginal Abatement Costs
Like non-Annex B regions which have not accepted any limitation of their future emissions at all FSU does
not face a binding carbon constraint. While FSU has committed to stabilize its emissions in the budget period at 1990
emission levels, its BaU emissions in 2010 stay far below the Kyoto target (see Table 6). The low emission baseline
is due to the sharp economic recession between 1990 and 2000 joint with exogenous autonomous energy efficiency
improvements over the next decade. For all OECD countries the Kyoto targets are binding which implies the
imposition of domestic carbon taxes. Table 6 shows that the marginal abatement costs associated with the Kyoto
commitments are substantial ranging up to 300$US per metric ton of carbon for the case of JPN. The tax rates reflect
the fact that the Kyoto targets which appear modest with respect to 1990 emission levels translate into much higher
effective cutback  requirements for OECD countries with respect to their BaU emission levels in 2010. For example,
OOE is allowed to increase emissions by 7% over 1990 levels under the Kyoto Protocol; nevertheless, this implies an
effective abatement of more than 15% in its BaU emissions by 2010. The level of abatement is a key determinant of
the marginal abatement costs. The further out we are on the abatement cost curve the more costly it gets to substitute
away from carbon in production and consumption. Apart from the abatement level the marginal abatement costs
depend to a large extent on differences in carbon intensity for different sectors across countries. For example, JPN
faces much higher carbon taxes compared to USA to achieve an almost identical relative cutback of carbon
emissions.  This is because JPN uses relatively little carbon in sectors with low-cost substitution possibilities, in
particular electricity generation (due to nuclear power). As a consequence JPN has to cut back relatively more
emissions in other sectors such as traffic where abatement comes more costly.
Table 6: Effective emission cutback requirements and marginal abatement costs (carbon taxes) in 2010
-------------------------------------------------------------------
     Cutback Carbon tax
(in % from BaU)   (US$ per metric ton of carbon)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
USA        27.5       160.4
CAN        27.5       230.2
EUR        13.7       107.0
JPN        26.0       299.8
OOE        15.8         75.9
FSU       -48.1           0.0
-------------------------------------------------------------------
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Welfare Costs
The tax-induced reallocation of resources such as fuel shifting or energy savings causes efficiency costs
which translate into a loss in real income for households. To gain further insights into the different sources of welfare
changes associated with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol we make use of our decomposition method.
Column “IME” of Table 7 reports the aggregate international market effect which together with the
domestic market effect “DME” yields the total policy effects as stated by column “TPE” of Table 7. We see that
unilateral abatement of Annex B parties produces significant secondary terms of trade effects which affect both
abating Annex B and non-abating developing countries. 10 The international spill-overs induce substantial welfare
losses for FSU as well as MPC and a rather small loss for ROW. All other non-abating countries benefit to varying
extents from the changes in international prices associated with carbon abatement in OECD countries.
As to abating OECD countries the decomposition conveys additional  information on the sign and
magnitude of  the primary and secondary effect. We see that international spill-overs are negative for USA, CAN and
OOE whereas EUR and  JPN benefit from the adjustments on international markets.
Table 7: Decomposition of welfare effects – Hicksian equivalent variation in income (% change from BaU)
---------------------------------------------------------------
            DME         WKT         ENE         TPE         IME
---------------------------------------------------------------
USA      -0.360      -0.378      -0.393      -0.395      -0.035
CAN      -0.694      -0.858      -0.976      -0.878      -0.184
EUR      -0.140      -0.063      -0.081      -0.065       0.075
JPN      -0.439      -0.382      -0.356      -0.299       0.140
OOE      -0.126      -0.474      -0.537      -0.649      -0.523
FSU       0.000      -0.420      -0.916      -1.030      -1.030
CEA       0.000       0.256       0.311       0.290       0.290
CHN       0.000       0.253       0.284       0.200       0.200
IND       0.000       0.319       0.354       0.269       0.269
BRA       0.000       0.079       0.084       0.087       0.087
ASI       0.000       0.258       0.174       0.137       0.137
MPC       0.000      -0.756      -0.865      -0.992      -0.992
ROW       0.000      -0.047      -0.038      -0.079      -0.079
---------------------------------------------------------------
DME: domestic market effect
WKT: welfare change including DME and terms of trade effects on coal and crude oil markets
ENE: welfare change including DME and terms of trade effects on all energy markets
TPE: total (general equilibrium) policy effect
IME: international market effect
                                                       
10 Of course, the secondary benefit or burden is identical to the total (general equilibrium) effect for those countries
which do not undertake domestic action (i.e. their primary effect is zero).
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To explain the nature of the secondary welfare benefits or losses across countries we apply our
decomposition method subsequently for various international markets. Columns “DME” through “TPE” of Table 7
summarize how the domestic market effect evolves towards the full policy effect from the SOE perspective when we
“switch” on successively changes in international prices determined by the MRT counterfactual solution.
 Most important are the spill-over effects associated with the adjustments on international coal and gas
markets which are treated as homogeneous goods (Column “WKT”). The cutback in demands for fossil energies
from abating OECD countries depresses the international prices for oil and in particular for carbon-intensive coal. As
a consequence countries which are net importer of gas and oil will gain whereas net exporting countries will loose.
Table 8 provides a summary of the BaU net trade position in coal and crude oil across countries.
Table 8: Trade Position on Coal and Crude Oil Markets
---------------------------------------------------
    Coal           Crude Oil
---------------------------------------------------
USA exp imp
CAN exp imp
EUR imp imp
JPN imp imp
OOE exp imp
FSU imp exp
CEA exp imp
CHN imp imp
IND imp imp
BRA imp imp
ASI imp imp
MPC exp exp
ROW exp exp
---------------------------------------------------
  exp: net exporter
  imp: net importer
For CAN and MPC which are net exporter of both coal and crude oil the aggregate welfare effect is
unambiguously negative. Likewise net importers EUR, JPN, CHN, IND, BRA and ASI experience welfare gains. For
countries, which are net importer of one homogeneous fossil fuel and net exporter of the other homogeneous fossil
fuel, the aggregate effect depends on export and import quantities as well as the relative changes in international coal
and crude oil prices. FSU, for example, looses more on the crude oil export side than it benefits on the coal import
side. Changes in terms of trade for the other energy goods (electricity, refined oil, and gas) cause welfare losses for
Annex-B countries11 whereas the developing countries except for ASI and MPC benefit (see above Column “ENE” of
                                                       
11 The one exception is Japan where electricity generation is mainly based on nuclear power.
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Table 7 ). The main reason is that OECD countries loose competitiveness in electricity generation and oil processing
due to the imposition of high carbon taxes.12
Finally, we account for changes on the non-energy markets to replicate the MRT counterfactual solution.
On these markets, developing countries face adverse spill-over effects. Due to product heterogeneity, abating OECD
countries can pass on part of their cost increase in domestic production to non-abating trading partners. Tax burden
shifting occurs not only between abating and non-abating countries but also among abating OECD countries, which
are typically large trading partners. This explains the welfare losses for OOE which has the lowest carbon taxes and
trades intensively with other abating countries with higher carbon taxes, in particular Japan. In intra-OECD trade,
OOE is therefore rather a tax burden importer than a tax burden exporter.
It should be noted that the application above serves primarily illustrative purposes with respect to our
decomposition approach. Before drawing policy conclusions a comprehensive sensitivity analysis with respect to key
parameters (e.g. elasticities, projections of GDP or energy demand) would be necessary.
4. Conclusions
We presented a decomposition of general equilibrium effects induced by policy intervention in trade
models. When national economies are linked through international trade, adjustments of economic activities in one
country will spill over to other countries via changes in export and import quantities. The associated changes in
international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all trading countries. Our decomposition
splits the overall welfare effect into a domestic market effect holding international prices constant and international
market effects as a result of changes in  international prices (terms of trade). Decomposing the overall welfare effect
into these component parts conveys important economic information as to why a country will benefit or loose from
adjustments on international markets. Our decomposition represents a general concept, is intuitively appealing, and
its numerical implementation within the GE framework is straightforward.
We demonstrated the usefulness of our decomposition approach in the context of an applied welfare
analysis of international carbon abatement policies.
The decomposition might not only be used for a more thorough understanding of  the aggregate general
equilibrium effects implied by policy intervention in open economies. At the policy level, consistent cost estimates
                                                       
12 The welfare losses for MPC, ASI and FSU are related to the decrease in demand and prices for their gas exports.
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on international spill-overs constitute an important criterion for evaluating the effects of domestic policies in the
international context. Information on the magnitude and distribution of secondary benefits or costs from policy
intervention could, for example, influence international policy agreements with respect to the design of  “equitable”
transfer systems.
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